classes bear the burden of the turmoil, and the banking and financial systems higher up the 'imperial chain' of national banking and financial systems must be more resilient than those lower down, so that subordinate nations and regions bear the cost. This is where the state comes in. The various national banking and financial systems are regulated and supervised and, where appropriate, supported by injections of official liquidity, in such a way that the damage caused by the turmoil is directed away from the dominant classes and the centre towards the subordinate classes and the periphery.
After examining the core features of the supervisory and regulatory regime organized under continued US domination by the early 1990s to ensure that financial and economic turmoil is managed so it extends and reproduces global capitalism, we then turn specifically to the 1997 Asian and 1998 LongTerm Capital Management (LTCM) crises to see how they affected the policies of the authorities -the G-10 central banks, G-7 ministries of finance, IMF, BIS, and other related bodies -that were responsible for managing the global economy. 1 The reforms that these authorities implemented in response to the two crises -the 'New International Financial Architecture' -did not change anything essential. The policy makers continued to believe in the rationality and efficiency of financial markets, reasserted their desire to create a fully internationalized global economy, and renewed their efforts to maintain the profitability of banking and finance. On the other hand, the Asian and LTCM crises did affect their views on the nature of neoliberal capitalism in significant ways. In particular, the policy makers came to see that financial crises were an inevitable feature of the neoliberal regime they had created and thus that the focus of their reforms should be on controlling rather than eliminating them. Contrary to those who believe neoliberalism implies a lack of regulation, moreover, the reforms that they implemented increased rather than decreased regulatory oversight of the global financial system, albeit in a decidedly neoliberal manner. In this, the authorities followed an old pattern: the liberalization and internationalization of capitalist production relations during the neoliberal period have always been accompanied by nearly continuous re-regulation of the global financial system in response to its recurrent financial crises.
The banking regulation, supervision, and lender-of-last-resort policies that have been in place since the early 1990s, and that were strengthened in the wake of the Asian and LTCM crises, have played a role in maintaining global capitalism under US domination as important as the role played by local police forces, or by the United States' military in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. And, it is precisely because of the central role the of US financial authorities in the making of these policies as well as because the US banking and financial system is the strongest and most resilient in the world that, as we note in conclusion, the United States not only has the capacity to sustain its own massive current account deficit but also to reproduce its position at the top of the imperial chain.
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS: FINANCIAL TURMOIL, RISK MANAGEMENT AND NEOLIBERAL DISCIPLINE
Financial crises and the economic contractions that follow are not haphazard events. Financial crises occur because imbalances build up between the financial system and the underlying macroeconomy -imbalances between stocks of financial assets and liabilities, on the one hand, and flows of national income, on the other -and they occur when these macroeconomic financial stock/income flow imbalances become unsustainable. 2 The 'function' of financial crises and the economic contractions that they create is to remove these imbalances between the financial system and its macroeconomic 'monetary base.' Under neoliberalism, there is a greater tendency for imbalances of this sort to appear. Stating the issue in classical Marxist terms, since the equity and debt instruments that make up the financial system exist as fictitious capitals -as discounted future expected profit streams -the financial and economic turmoil that characterizes neoliberal global capitalism expresses itself, in the first instance, in an increase in the tendency for the financial markets to over-and under-estimate future profits. The damage caused is not just economic bubbles but also the misallocation of capital.
But why has this occurred? 3 The internationalization of the circuits of capital has created a truly global economy, but not abolished the nation state. Due to the continued existence of a system of territorially sovereign national states and thus the continued use of different national currencies as mediums of exchange within each national territory, intrusions of essentially local factors -national currencies affected by domestically determined interest rates -disrupt the movement of capital through its global circuits. Regardless of whether it exists in its money, commodity, or productive form at the time, a capital is denominated in the currency of the nation whose space it occupies for the moment and thus must change its currency denomination as it moves from one national territory to the next. The point we are making is simple. A US multinational corporation operating a factory in Brazil, for example, pays its local labour force and purchases any locally produced intermediate products using Real. Not only that: the whole enterprise is accounted for in Real, including the depreciation of the capital stock. Inputs produced in another nation are accounted for in the currency of that nation.
Products sold locally earn Real; those sold elsewhere earn the local currency. A factory operating in another country is accounted for in the currency of that country. One of the tasks of the treasury department of the home office in the United States is to translate the foreign activities of the firm into US dollars in such a way as to maximize the firm's profits on a global basis. The financial assets that trade on the Euro and other external financial markets are the sole exception to this 'local currency' rule. But this is why they were created: they exist to help multinational corporations hedge their exposures and thus maximize their global profits in their home currencies.
Due to the uneven movement of capital through its global circuits, moreover, these nationally specific monetary/financial obstacles are different in different parts of the globe -and are subject to change. The financial obstacles that disrupt the global circuits of capital are themselves discontinuous as a result, because they are contingent and uncertain. Their contingency and uncertainty, in turn, makes the movement of global capital through its circuits contingent and uncertain. In the new neoliberal global economy there is thus no longer a single money commodity, as there was under the nineteenth century gold standard, functioning as a universal standard of value throughout the global economy. Nor is there a single state-backed national currency that can fulfill the same role, as the US dollar did under the Bretton Woods system until the early 1970s. Instead, there is a multiplicity of different national currency commodities that circulate internationally at changing rates of exchange against each other, and a parallel multiplicity of domestically determined and constantly changing interest rates -and this manifold of changing exchange and interest rates is itself continually being restructured by the foreign exchange and interest rate derivatives that make up the global money market. 4 As a result, the transformation of socially necessary labour time into prices of production has become a radically contingent process, since the monetary values in terms of which economic value is measured are different in different parts of the globe, change relative to one another across monetary areas as well as over time within each monetary space, and are also being continually transmuted through the use of derivatives. Deep-seated, persistent financial and economic turmoil is therefore a characteristic feature of neoliberal global capitalism because of the resulting increase in the uncertainty of the global accumulation processwhich in turn increases the uncertainty of the profits of capital as a whole.
These contingencies and uncertainties exist because of the particular way in which capitalism became structured towards the end of the twentieth century as a world economic system divided into nation states, organized into three imperial or sub-imperial blocs, centred on the economies and currencies of United States, Europe, and Japan. 5 As the internationalization of the circuits of capital has taken place primarily among the countries of the centre, these contingencies and uncertainties arise chiefly in the centre rather than in the periphery: a capital faces greater uncertainties as it moves between any of the three major imperial-currency blocs than it does when it circulates within a single imperial-currency bloc. 6 But we must not hold the 'liberalized' global financial system itself primarily responsible for the financial turmoil that this situation tends to produce. The opposite is in fact the case: the global financial system has the responsibility for managing and containing the financial contingencies and uncertainties that disrupt the global accumulation process.
This last point is very important. The financial system still has to mediate between savers and investors, and to that end, global financial capital continues to fulfill the traditional tasks of collecting the idle monies in the hands of individual capitals, of bringing these individual money capitals together to form what David Harvey has called the 'common capital of the capitalist class', 7 and of allocating them to the most profitable investment outlets wherever they may be. Today, however, the financial system also has to manage the spatial and inter-temporal financial uncertainties that intrude into the operation of the law of value. The financial contingencies that global capital has to contend with as it moves through its circuits call for the use of the risk management techniques that the global financial system now provides, and the success of the risk management strategies employed affects the performance of the underlying economy fully as much as the way the aggregate global social capital is allocated.
The resulting transformation of the day-to-day operation of domestic and international financial markets has been profound. Indeed, most of the features of the global economy today that are alluded to under the rubric of 'financialization' can be explained in terms of the competitive struggle between individual capitals to profit from the global economy's need to hedge against the financial contingencies that would otherwise disrupt the international circulation of capital. These include dramatic increases in the trading volumes of both exchange-traded and over-the-counter securities; securitization (the transformation of mortgages and other apparently nonmarketable assets into marketable securities); the extensive use of derivatives; hedge funds; increases in the financial activities of ostensibly non-financial corporations; the rise of the large multinational financial conglomerates that now dominate the global financial system; and the increase in the proportion of the social surplus transferred to finance.
Trading activity has risen in the stock, bond, foreign exchange, and money markets in every country because trading allows an individual company to pass onto another company a risk that it does not want to assume, and thus permits the spreading of the risk to whoever wishes to bear it. The advantages of securitization are similar. Securitization permits a bank to exchange the mortgages, car loans, credit cards, etc. it creates for cash or other securities. Derivatives -securities whose values are defined in terms of the performance of other securities -are used extensively because they allow a company to bridge the gaps between different spatial and inter-temporal uncertainties and thus allow it to restructure these exposures in any way it sees fit. Hedge funds exist to absorb the risks that the large multinational financial conglomerates do not want to bear. Multinational non-financial corporations engage in financial activities to manage their own exposures because it is less costly for them to do it themselves. In addition to other factors making for the concentration and centralization of capital, large financial conglomerates dominate the global financial system because their size and global scope allow them to transfer and so diversify their risks internally, using their own risk measurement and allocation systems to do so as efficiently as possible. And finance absorbs so much of the social surplus simply because its risk management activities are needed. Several factors, however, limit the capacity of the international financial system to manage the risks of the global accumulation process. First, financial crises no longer function, as they did under the gold standard or the Bretton Woods system, fully to remove the imbalances that arise between a country's financial system and its monetary base. Since there is no stable monetary unit of value against which the fictitious capital values can be measured, the manner in which a financial crisis is resolved depends on the response of the monetary base. Changes in exchange rates and interest rates can alter the underlying macroeconomy so as to lessen or intensify a crisis or to keep it contained in a particular part of the globe -or they can create a financial contagion that spreads the turmoil elsewhere. The financial and economic turmoil thus never really disappears but assumes an essentially protean form, so that one crisis transmutes into the next. Second, the spatial and inter-temporal discontinuities that disrupt the international circulation of capital have a particularly profound effect on the circulation of global financial capital itself. The international financial system has to manage its own uncertainties as well as those of commercial and industrial capitaluncertainties that in any case essentially are irresolvable. Third, the competition between individual capitals to profit from the global economy's risk management needs cannot but lead to misallocations of these risks that increase the uncertainty of the accumulation process. Financial institutions can and do underestimate the risks they are assuming and thus take on too much risk relative to their capacity to manage it. The search for profits tempts them to underestimate the risks in whole regions of the globe and thus to misallocate their capital. Global financial capital therefore has a task that it will inevitably mismanage. This is why financial crises appear. Imbalances arise between the financial system and the underlying macroeconomy because the financial system cannot always contain the risks it is supposed to contain, and because competition leads individual financial capitals to take on risks they cannot bear.
Here is where the state comes in. The international economic system through which global capital moves as it completes its circuits is not just discontinuous; it is also fundamentally hierarchical. The national monetary spaces through which a capital circulates exist in relations of domination and subordination. The multiplicity of national currencies and domestically determined interest rates that disrupt the circulation of capital form a strict hierarchy, an 'imperial chain' of more powerful and less powerful national banking and financial systems. The liberalization and internationalization of capitalist production relations have not abolished the hierarchical and antagonistic relationships that exist between the centre and the periphery of the world economy, between the imperial powers within the centre, and between capital and labour worldwide. They have simply altered the way in which these structures of domination manifest themselves.
The introduction of financial contingencies into the operation of the law of value has created a capitalism characterized by a deep-seated and persistent financial and economic turbulence, and in doing so, it has changed the way in which capitalism reproduces itself. The turmoil is not just an economic phenomenon. It both shapes and is shaped by the capitalist and imperial social relationships that constitute the world economic system and is thus essentially political. The turmoil maintains and restructures capitalist and imperial social relationships by disciplining and punishing the subordinate classes or nations involved just as surely as do the local police and the military. The weapons deployed are not billy clubs and bombs but financial crises and the ensuing stagnations.
Neoliberalism is not just an effort to privatize the reproduction of capitalist and imperial social relations production, an attempt to turn over to the private sector many functions that had previously been considered legitimate functions of the state. Neoliberalism is a truly radical project to establish a kind of social control very different from that employed during the 'Golden Age' of Keynesian economics and US 'New Deal' imperialism. The discipline used during the Golden Age is probably best understood in terms of Gramsci's concept of hegemony, which he defined as consent plus force. This was a structure of domination where the dominant classes (in the centre if not in the periphery) and the dominant imperial power (the United States) were willing to make sacrifices of an 'economic-corporatist' kind. The subor-dinated classes and nations could consent to their subordination provided they could believe their short-term material interests would be met. State violence was still used when the consensus broke down, but as long as the consensus was maintained, the struggles that did occur were protracted political/ideological/cultural wars of position that took place in the first instance within the institutions of civil society. 8 The neoliberal project establishes a different form of domination, one where financial instability and economic insecurity replace compromise and consensus. The mechanisms of social control are much more direct. Global capital, under continued US domination, can maintain the subordination of the dominated classes and nations using what amounts to a financial and economic violence, backed up by militarized police action when economic intimidation breaks down. The manipulation of cultural symbols by the global mass media can fill any residual need for legitimacy. 9 The introduction of new financial contingencies into the operation of the law of value has therefore given the global financial system new responsibilities. As the financial infrastructure of a capitalist and imperial world system, it must manage financial and economic risk and turmoil in such a way that they reproduce the hierarchical relations between the centre and periphery, between the imperialist powers within the centre, and between global capital and global labour. The global financial system must therefore have the crisis management capacities needed to contain and shape risk, and to calm and shape turmoil when it erupts into financial crises and recessions, and it does these things in very specific ways. The imperial chain of national banking and financial systems that make up the global financial system must be so organized as to reproduce itself through recurrent financial crises. In this way, the burden of a crisis will not be borne by financial capital in the form of lower profits, bank failures, and insolvencies but by the subordinate classes in the form of unemployment, poverty, and greater inequality. This also means that the banking and financial systems higher up the imperial chain must have greater risk management capacities than those lower down. The 'ideal' neoliberal global economy is one where all of the harm caused by the instability is transferred to the dominated classes and the periphery. 10 CAPITAL'S REGULATORY REGIME The policy regime that accomplishes all this is surprisingly simple. The core features of neoliberal global capitalism's supervisory and regulatory regime are, first, internationally uniform risk-based capital standards, developed by the BIS's Committee on Banking Supervision, that permit the large multinational financial conglomerates that dominate the international financial system to set their own capital requirements based on their own internal risk models; second, the principle, also promulgated by the Basel Committee, that home countries in the centre and not host countries in the periphery have the supervisory, regulatory, and lender-of-last-resort responsibilities for multinational financial conglomerates; and third, a division of labour between the IMF and the central banks in the centre according to quite different principles than the first two, whereby the IMF resolves financial crises in the periphery by imposing austerity, while the major central banks resolve financial crises in the centre by easing credit. 11 The US authorities took the initiative in the development of the BIS capital standards. The initiative was taken in response to the difficulties that the Latin American debt crisis caused to the US banking system, and the capital requirements were initially designed to protect a bank against its credit risks. According to the original 1988 Basel Capital Accord, all internationally active banks, regardless of where they are headquartered, must maintain a capital reserve fund equal to 8 per cent of their risk-adjusted assets. The amounts of capital that a bank must hold in reserve to back up its particular portfolio of investments increase with the credit risks associated with its investments: the credit-risk weights of each of the bank's assets are determined by prescribed formulas, and off-balance sheet as well as on-balance sheet investments are subject to the capital requirements. 12 Since less creditworthy assets have a higher risk-weight, the capital requirements force financial institutions to allocate their capital according to the credit risks of their investments. Banks are penalized for making risky investments and rewarded for making safe investments. The banks must also maintain capital reserve funds sufficiently large to insure them against insolvency in the event that their counterparties are unable to honour their commitments. The capital requirements thus aim to make each financial institution strong enough to survive its own risk-taking.
The capital requirements under the 1988 Capital Accord went into effect at the end of 1992. The Accord was amended in 1996 to incorporate the market risks arising from banks' open positions in foreign exchange and traded debt securities, equities, commodities, and options. 13 In the amended Capital Accord, banks must hold capital against both their credit and their market risks, and the overall minimum capital ratio remains at 8 per cent. An important aspect of this amendment was that, subject to strict quantitative and qualitative standards and the approval of their supervisors, banks could use their own internal risk models for measuring their market risk capital requirements. The amended Accord thus created a two-tiered system of banks. The large multinational financial conglomerates that have the resources to set up and run their own internal risk-measurement and riskmanagement systems are allowed to determine their own capital requirements, and are expected in principle to set aside a capital reserve fund sufficiently large to protect them from insolvency at a predetermined probability. If properly enforced, the amended capital standards also imply that the supervisory and regulatory authorities of the major capitalist states work 'hand-in-glove' with their multinational financial conglomerates on a daily basis to monitor how the conglomerates measure and thus allocate their global market risks. The smaller and less sophisticated banks, which cannot quantify their survivability in this way, have their market risks determined by the 'standard measurement method' specified in the amendment to the Accord, and thus presumably require less attention -and help -from the regulators. Many of these smaller and less sophisticated banks are of course headquartered in the periphery.
Crucial to understanding how the capital requirements function is the priority that the authorities give to the capital requirements as the first of the 'Three Pillars' of the Capital Accord relative to the other two -market disclosure and discipline, and prudential supervision and regulation. 14 The emphasis is placed on the capital requirements that rely on financial institutions' internal risk-management systems. Market and disclosure discipline comes second. The authorities de-emphasize the traditional activities of official regulators and supervisors, who actively enforce externally determined regulations. The 8 per cent capital requirement is a minimum capital ratio. A bank's supervisor may require it to maintain a higher one. But the authorities may have no need to enforce any requirement that a bank have a higher capital ratio, due to market discipline. Since a bank's capital ratio is made public, it functions as a quick and easy measure of the bank's soundness. Banks with high capital ratios have easy access to both capital and credit. The markets punish banks with low capital ratios.
As for prudential supervision and regulation, after the failure of the Bankhaus Herstatt in 1974, the G-10 central banks determined that the home country, and not the host country central bank, has the ultimate responsibility for the foreign branch of an internationally active bank. 15 Until this time, the G-10 central banks had not determined how they should share the responsibility for resolving international financial crises. The first major decision of the Basel Committee concerned how these responsibilities should be discharged under a 'Condordat' (made public in 1983) that established that no foreign banking establishment should escape supervision, that the supervision should be adequate, and that the home country rather than the host country should be responsible for supervising the foreign branch. The agreements reached in the Condordat were subsequently revised and strengthened to become the 'home country rule' of international banking supervision, according to which the home country has the supervisory, regulatory, and lender-of-last resort responsibilities, on a global consolidated basis, for the internationally active banks that are headquartered there. Thus, the authorities of the imperial powers in the centre of the global economy, who have the greatest crisis prevention and management capacities and in whose countries the multinational financial conglomerates are headquartered, have the responsibility for supervising, regulating, and maintaining the liquidity of their multinational banks and investment houses no matter where they may do their business. The authorities in the centre are thus responsible for the behaviour of the branches of their banks in the periphery and so indirectly responsible for the banking and financial systems of the periphery in so far as the interests of their banks are involved. The regulators in the periphery are responsible only for their own banks and the few foreign branches these banks may have.
This prudential supervision and regulation aspect of the Basel Accord is related as well to the division of labour mentioned above whereby the IMF stabilizes a crisis in the periphery through a structural adjustment programme, while the major central banks stabilize a crisis in the centre by a monetary easing. The purpose of the IMF's austerity in the periphery is to prevent the turmoil that originates there from spreading to the centre. The purpose of the monetary easing in the centre is to end any turmoil that may appear there -regardless of its origin. This division of labour was not the product of a formal agreement, but originated informally in the 1980s during the Latin American debt crisis, for this was when the IMF was redesigned in order to impose structural adjustment programmes on the debtor nations, and when the authorities in the United States learned to ease or extend state credit to troubled firms to counter the 1987 stock market crash and resolve the ensuing US savings and loans crisis.
The G-10 central bankers who set up the BIS capital requirements in 1988 and revised them in 1996 were certainly not thinking in terms of the law of value as they tried to cope with the uncertainties and contingencies that intrude into its operation today. Still, it is no mere coincidence that the riskbased capital requirements encourage risk taking and risk management on the part of market participants. By forcing all internationally active financial institutions to allocate their capital according to the risks of their investments, internationally uniform risk-based capital requirements have created a global financial system designed to manage the risks of the accumulation process. Internationally uniform risk-based capital requirements also require every internationally active financial institution to hold a capital reserve sufficient large so that it can survive its own risk taking. By thus laying the ground for the solvency of every financial institution by means of rules intended to relegate bank failure to a low level of probability, the BIS Capital Accord designed a global financial system that is, in principle, also resilient enough to survive its own disorder.
The G-10 central bankers gave the global financial system another noteworthy property: risk-based capital requirements force financial institutions to cut back on their lending during a financial crisis. Since equity makes up the largest part of a bank's capital, the total value of its capital is largely determined by the value of its equity in the stock market and thus will fall sharply in any financial crisis that includes a stock market crash. Meanwhile, according to the formula set up by the Basel Committee, the volatility of a financial crisis increases the measured market risks of the financial conglomerates that use their own internal risk models to determine their own capital requirements. 16 During a financial crisis, therefore, the capital requirements become more burdensome just when the available capital is most likely to decline. To meet the capital requirements, the large financial conglomerates must decrease their investments, that is, cut back on their extensions of credit. In creating a global financial system designed to manage the risks of the global accumulation process and to be resilient enough to survive its own disorder, the G-10 central bankers also designed a global banking and financial system that in stabilizing itself, destabilizes the underlying macroeconomy.
The imperial chain of national banking and financial systems is maintained by way of two-tiered market risk capital requirements, the home country rule principle, and the contrasting crisis-management policies of the IMF and the major central banks. A multinational financial conglomerate headquartered in the centre of the global economy is able to use its own internal risk models to set its own market risk capital requirements, is supervised on a global consolidated basis by a strong and resourceful regulator, who will work with the multinational firm daily to increase the efficiency of its risk measurement and allocation methods, and can count on injections of official liquidity should the bank, despite all this, need it. A smaller and less sophisticated financial institution headquartered in the periphery, by contrast, must set its market risk capital requirements using the rule-based 'standard methodology', is supervised by a weaker (and perhaps very weak) regulatory authority, and will face an IMF-imposed structural adjustment programme should a financial crisis hit its country. The market discipline created by this system is obvious: the bank headquartered in the periphery is placed at a competitive disadvantage relative to the multinational financial conglomerate.
THE ASIAN AND LTCM FINANCIAL CRISES AS TURNING-POINTS
The amended Capital Accord went into effect at the end of 1997, just as the Asian crisis was reaching its climax. That crisis and the LTCM crisis that followed in 1998 were not the first financial crises of the neoliberal period. Federal Reserve Chairman Volcker's 1979 monetary policy shock did not just end the 1970s inflation, it also precipitated a Latin American debt crisis which would burden the US financial system and the Latin American economies throughout the 1980s. The debt crisis was followed by the US stock market crash in 1987, the US Savings and Loans crisis of the late 1980s, the meltdown of the Japanese financial system and economy in the early 1990s following the bursting of Japanese stock market and real estate bubbles, the European Monetary System's crises of 1992 and 1993, and the Mexican peso crisis of 1994-95. The Asian and LTCM crises were turning-points in the history of neoliberal global capitalism, however, for at least four reasons.
First, because of their intensity and global scope. The financial turmoil that began with the devaluation of the Thai baht in July 1997 spread swiftly from Thailand to Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, and the Republic of South Korea (the other countries at the centre of the crisis), leaving economic devastation in its wake. 17 By the end of 1997, the Asian financial panic pushed these economies into a steep contraction, with Indonesia experiencing the largest decline. In doing so, the Asian crisis brought to an end what had hitherto been one of the longest periods of rapid growth ever to occur in the periphery: the 'Asian miracle' of the 1980s and early 1990s.
The Asian financial panic also reduced the profits of the multinational banks and investment houses that had invested heavily in Southeast Asia and South Korea. Japanese banks were hit particularly hard. Already burdened by the nonperforming loans that had appeared on their books due to the collapse of the 'bubble economy' in the early 1990s, Japanese banks had attempted to consolidate their investments worldwide by concentrating their foreign exposures in the countries that were now at the centre of the crisis. The losses they experienced on their investments there added to their already considerable burdens. The effect was to push any recovery of the Japanese economy into the indefinite future. The harm that the Asian crisis did to the profits of the large multinational financial conglomerates also led them to reduce their exposure to the periphery more generally, and this, in turn, had an immediate adverse effect on emerging market economies worldwide -an effect made worse because the authorities in the periphery were forced to adopt contractionary fiscal and monetary policies to counter the downward pressure on their currencies. By early 1998, signs of acute financial and economic stress began to appear in Russia, Brazil, and Argentina.
Following a period of calm in the spring and early summer of 1998, the financial turmoil resurfaced in the fall when, following the Russian default in August, the collapse of the LTCM hedge fund led to panic in the very heart of the world financial system. The unwinding of the fund's highly leveraged derivative positions caused the otherwise very liquid US Treasury market, positioned at the very apex of the hierarchy of global financial markets, to freeze up, causing a potential threat to the foundation of the entire system. For a moment in the fall of 1998, therefore, with the financial systems of the periphery already in crisis and the US Treasury market, typically the deepest and most liquid financial market in the world, in disarray, the global financial system really did seem on the verge of collapse.
Second, the Asian and LTCM crises were turning-points, because they were the first financial crises fully to reveal the neoliberal nature of the turmoil. Unlike the 1980s Latin American debt crisis, the countries at the centre of the Asian crisis were following policies entirely in keeping with the precepts of neoliberal thinking. Tight fiscal and monetary policies, low inflation, and high private sector saving and investment rates characterized all of the crisis countries before the crisis broke. They had also recently liberalized both their domestic financial systems and their capital accounts, thus dismantling the mechanisms that had previously allowed them to pursue activist industrial policies without interference from the international financial system. The proximate causes of the 1980s Latin America debt crisis, the 1993 EMS crisis, and the 1994-95 peso crisis were specific actions on the part of national governments in the centre of the global economy: the 1979 Volcker money supply shocks, the high interest-rate policy adopted by the recently reunited Germany, which was inconsistent with existing EMS parities, and another round of tightening by the Federal Reserve in 1994. The Asian crisis, by contrast, was a purely private sector phenomenon, an endogenously-determined asset boom-bust cycle, involving lending by G-10 banks -mostly in the form of increasingly short-term bonds -to private borrowers in the crisis countries, who, in turn, had used the monies for increasingly speculative purposes. Unlike previous financial crises, which were widely anticipated, the Asian crisis also caught international investors by surprise, and when they suddenly became aware of size of their impending losses, they withdrew their capital from the region in a panic. In the first half of 1997, foreign capital had continued to flow into the crisis countries on a massive scale; the swing from a capital inflow to an outflow in late 1997 was over 10 per cent of the GDP of the countries involved. In contrast to previous periods of acute financial turmoil, once the Asian crisis started to unfold and spread, it took on a dynamic of its own, which no authority, the IMF included, could stop or control until it had run its course -that is, until the imbalances that had built up between the financial systems of the afflicted countries and their underlying macroeconomies had been removed.
The neoliberal origins of the LTCM crisis are equally obvious. Ahead of the Russian default the LTCM hedge fund had reportedly adopted a set of very large and highly-leveraged trading strategies, mostly through the use of derivatives, that assumed credit spreads would narrow, equities would rise, and the volatility of the financial markets would fall. In taking on these positions, the firm was not attempting to guess the future direction of the market or the underlying macroeconomy. Instead, based on a presumably rigorous statistical analysis of past price movements, LTCM's strategy aimed at arbitraging price discrepancies: it purchased securities its theoretical model suggested were underpriced and sold and 'shorted' securities its model suggested were overpriced. The large banks and investment houses that were on the other side of LTCM's trades welcomed its complex arbitrage strategies. Before the appearance of LTCM, they had used other firms to unload their risks. However, due to its reputation for high standards and sophisticated risk-management systems, as well as to its size and global reach, LTCM came to play a very special role in the international financial system: it became the place where the multinational financial conglomerates believed their most complex risks would be most expertly managed.
Following the Russian default, however, when global financial markets began to move simultaneously in the same direction, with credit spreads widening, equity markets falling, and volatility increasing in every market, LTCM began to experience losses on every front. As the firm tried to reduce its exposures, it found that the attempt to do so aggravated its difficulties. The LTCM's counterparties made its situation worse by attempting to unwind their own positions. Soon the liquidity of the credit derivative, interest rate swap, US Treasury, and other fixed income markets where LTCM had been most active began to disappear. The crisis came to a head when LTCM reportedly could not make the margin call on a large losing 'short' position in the Treasury bill futures market. Had LTCM actually defaulted, the futures market clearing house might have collapsed, in which case the Treasury bill market would have become illiquid. Under these circumstances, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York organized a private support operation for the firm in late September 1998, as it had clearly taken on more risks than it could bear. However, the global financial system did not regain its ability to manage the risks of the accumulation process until the Federal Reserve restored the system's liquidity by easing interest rates in October.
The third reason why the Asian and LTCM financial crises were historical turning-points was that the turmoil they unleashed is still very much with us. Though the LTCM-related turmoil in the centre quickly abated following the Federal Reserve's interventions, the Fed's actions had little effect on the forces that the Russian default and LTCM's demise had set in motion in the periphery, forces that would eventually lead to the floating of the Brazilian Real in January 1999 and to Argentina's depression and subsequent default in December 2001. Moreover, the interest rate reductions that ended the LTCM turmoil helped fuel what Federal Reserve Chairman Greenspan had already called the 'irrational exuberance' of the US stock market. The consequences were the stock-market-bubble-driven recovery of the US in the late 1990s and hence the recession that occurred when the 'dot.com' bubble burst in 2000. Due to decisive countercyclical action on the part of the Federal Reserve, this time in the form of another round of interest rate reductions, the ensuing recession in the United States was mild. As of this writing in the summer of 2004, however, worries abound that the Fed's easing of credit allowed the financial turmoil to transmute into yet another stock market/housing bubble, whose collapse could end the recovery in the United States.
Finally, the Asian and LTCM crises were turning-points because of their political effects. The crises did succeed in reproducing existing class and imperial social relations. By bringing the Asian miracle to a halt and pushing any recovery in Japan into the indefinite future, the way the Asian crisis was resolved reinforced the economic victory of the United States over Japan that was initially accomplished with the collapse of Japan's 'bubble economy.' If there was an economy besides the United States that benefited from the Asian crisis, it was mainland China. With the end of the 'miracle' in Southeast Asian and South Korea and with Japan mired in stagnation, China became the centre of capital accumulation in Asia, even as millions of Chinese workers and peasants became 'redundant.' But by increasing unemployment, inequality, and poverty throughout the periphery, the Asian crisis put downward pressure on wages worldwide, thus increasing the global rate of exploitation. Meanwhile, the Federal Reserve's quick and decisive action, first to organize a private support operation for LTCM and then to lower interest rates, brought the LTCM crisis to a halt well before it could have any adverse effects on the position of the United States in the global economy.
On the other hand, the Asian and LTCM crises, and the Asian crisis in particular, caused many to question the merits of the neoliberal order. Due its severity, global scope and obvious neoliberal nature, the Asian crisis delegitimized neoliberalism as an historical project for many individuals throughout the globe, and in doing so, helped to launch the 'anti-globalization' movement. As combined with the subsequent LTCM crisis, it also led many of the policy makers who were responsible for managing the global financial system, and who had hitherto been advocates of neoliberalism, to express doubts about the viability of their previous efforts. The crises destroyed any lingering beliefs they may have had that the neoliberal order was not crisis-prone, and for a time made them doubt their ability to prevent and manage the crises they now believed would inevitably occur. In view of its failure to contain the contagion stemming from the Asian crisis, they questioned in particular the crisis prevention and management capacities of the IMF.
In this atmosphere, policies that previously had been seen as either irrelevant or radical were taken seriously. Capital controls, Tobin taxes, regulations placing quantitative restrictions on financial institutions' borrowing and lending, and other similar policies that earlier had been only discussed by the critics of neoliberalism suddenly had currency. For a time, as well, calls for a new and different regulatory institution, including a 'World Financial Authority', and for an international lender-of-last-resort received serious attention. 18 As the effects of the Asian and LTCM crises receded into the background, however, with the recovery of the US economy in the late 1990s, policy makers regained confidence both in neoliberalism and in their crisis management capacities. They lost interest in more radical and farreaching reforms and began to devise measures that would instead strengthen rather than change the existing policy regime. By the time of the G-7 summit meeting in Köln, in June 1999, the essential features of the reforms that would be implemented under the rubric of the 'New International Financial Architecture' had already been largely agreed upon. They were conservative.
THE 'NEW INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE'
Six principles governed the reform measures that the G-7 leaders endorsed at that time. 19 They were, first, that improved transparency and better codes of conduct would reduce the severity of future financial crises; second, that more extensive banking and financial market regulation would have the same effect; third, that the more serious informational and regulatory lapses lie in the periphery rather than in the industrialized centre; fourth, that the economies of the periphery should continue liberalizing their capital accounts, albeit subject to its proper sequencing; fifth, that the integration of the same economies into international capital markets requires them to pursue austere monetary and fiscal policies; and sixth, that the steps that had already been taken to improve the available crisis management facilities and policies were sufficient to handle future financial crises.
Central to the reform measures endorsed by the G-7 at the Köln summit meeting was the belief that insufficient information contributed significantly to the Asian and LTCM crises, and thus that 'improved information will help
[financial] markets adjust more smoothly to economic developments, minimize contagion and reduce volatility.' 20 To this end, the authorities took steps to make more timely and reliable information, mostly about developing countries, available to investors, and advocated the development and implementation of codes and standards of good practice for economic, financial, and business activities. They covered codes of good practice on fiscal transparency and in monetary and financial policy, as well as the codes and standards necessary for the proper functioning of the private financial system, including accounting and auditing, bankruptcy, corporate governance, insurance, payment and settlement systems, and the organization of securities markets.
The G-7 also stressed the need for improved regulation and supervision of the monetary and financial systems in both the centre and the periphery to deal with specific problems that the two crises had revealed. In the centre, the focus was on banks' dealings with hedge funds and similar operations in commercial and investment banks (proprietary trading desks) as well as on the regulation of offshore financial centres. The authorities also advocated measures to improve the management of lending to the periphery, especially of a short-term nature, to contain the foreign financing of risky investments there. For the periphery itself, measures were adopted concerning the need to manage the risks associated with the rapid growth of domestic credit, currency and maturity mismatches of assets and liabilities, the accumulation of large short-term borrowings in foreign currency, and the valuation of collateral during episodes of asset inflation.
The proposals adopted at Köln reflected the G-7 governments' commitment to financial market internationalization and liberalization. 'Recent events in the world economy', they argued, 'have demonstrated that a strengthening of the system is needed to maximize the benefits of, and reduce the risks posed by, global economic and financial integration.' By affirming the need for further internationalization and liberalization, the G-7 saw the problem of reforming the international financial architecture as largely one of filling in certain gaps in the provision of information, implementation of codes and standards, and regulation and supervision of financial markets and institutions. They shifted the burden of reform, however, away from the industrial countries to the developing world, for this was where the more serious informational and regulatory gaps supposedly were, and where greater openness to the international capital markets was still required. To this end, 'capital account liberalization should be carried out in a careful and wellsequenced manner, accompanied by a sound and well-regulated financial sector and by a consistent macroeconomic policy framework.' Though 'the use of controls on capital inflows may be justified for a transition period as countries strengthen the institutional and regulatory environment in their domestic financial systems', more comprehensive controls on inflows 'may carry costs and should not in any case be used as a substitute for reform.' Controls on outflows, the G-7 emphasized, 'can carry even greater costs.' The same commitment also shaped the kind of macroeconomic policies they stressed developing and emerging-market economies should adopt. Because of increasing international capital mobility, they warned, 'weak macroeconomic policies and financial infrastructures [in developing markets] can be penalized more severely and more suddenly by investors.' 21 The recommendation was strong: developing and transition economies should have tight monetary and fiscal policies leading to low wage and final goods inflation and exchange rate policies that lead to sustainable current account deficits and external debt burdens.
The depth and severity of the Asian turmoil, coupled with the apparent inability of the authorities to contain it or its contagion, led to the recognition that the Asian crisis was new, and thus that the policies that had been designed to manage 'current account' crises in the periphery were inappropriate to deal with the 'capital account' crises that were the product of internationalized financial markets. The IMF introduced new and expanded lending facilities, and advocated orderly 'standstill' and 'workout' agreements for debtor countries and their creditors. To increase the involvement of the private sector in the prevention and management of emerging-market financial crises, the G-7 also advocated 'the use of market based tools … aimed at facilitating adjustment to shocks through the use of innovative financial arrangements, including private market-based contingent credit lines in emerging countries and roll-over options in debt instruments.' They also stressed the importance 'of collective action clauses in sovereign debt contracts, along with other provisions that facilitate creditor coordination and discourage disruptive action' and encouraged 'efforts to establish sound and efficient bankruptcy procedures and strong judicial systems.' Finally, they warned that the resolution of a financial crisis in the periphery might require sacrifice on the part of foreign creditors to the periphery. The G-7 were quite explicit about the risks involved. They indicated that 'reducing net debt payments to the private sector can potentially contribute to meeting a country's immediate financing needs and reducing the amount of finance to be provided by the official sector;' and that since in 'exceptional cases, it may not be possible for the country to avoid the accumulation of arrears, IMF lending into arrears may be appropriate if the country is seeking a cooperative solution to its payment difficulties with its creditors'; and that in such exceptional cases, 'countries may impose capital and exchange controls as part of payments suspensions or standstills in conjunction with IMF support for their policies and programs, to provide time for an orderly debt restructuring.' 22 Certain features of the not-so-well-hidden imperial agenda of the G-7's reforms are easy to decipher. One does not have to believe that increased transparency and better codes of conduct will reduce the severity of financial crises to see that global capital would benefit from more accurate and timely information about the economies in the periphery or from uniform codes of conduct for the private financial systems there. Nor should the benefits that the countries involved would obtain from improved banking and financial market regulation and supervision blind us to the fact that capital would benefit from these as well. The interests of global capital are also clearly represented in the strong overall condemnation of capital controls, especially on outflows, and the requirement that the governments in the periphery adopt restrictive fiscal and monetary policies, as these will lower wages and cut inflation. It is not so obvious, however, why the authorities went out their way to warn investors about the risks of lending to the periphery, or why they took steps to 'involve' the private sector in the resolution of future financial crises there. Especially, given the severity of the LTCM crisis, it is also not clear why the authorities decided that the more serious lapses lay in the periphery and not in the centre.
An important BIS document on the Asian crisis contains the following statement about the regulatory framework that allowed the banks in the centre of the global financial system to weather that period of extreme turmoil:
While significant risks existed, there were also significant risk mitigants that played an important role regarding banks' ability to limit the negative effects of the Asian crisis. Solvency [capital] requirements of G10 bank supervisors and regulators allowed banks to better weather the problems associated with Asian risks with fewer fears of insolvency than in the earlier debt crisis. For example, US banks' total crossborder claims accounted for 500% of their capital in 1982; in June 1997, total cross-border claims represented 108% of capital. Moreover, the foreign claims of G10 banks were also much better diversified than in past crises, in terms of both countries and types of counterparties. Disclosure of risks by G10 banks in some countries improved compared with past emerging market crises, but the G10 countries had a diversity of experience in the quality of their banks' disclosures. For those market participants that made their risks more transparent, they and their supervisors were better able to judge risks and temper their actions accordingly.… Prudential supervision and regulation also assisted in protecting G10 banks from the Asian crisis. In particular, guidance by supervisory authorities on internal controls, risk management systems, lending limits and country risks aided G10 banks in managing their Asian exposure. Those banks with sound country risk, market risk and liquidity risk management systems appear to have been able to avoid significant loss. Regulators and supervisors themselves took away lessons from the 1980s debt crisis, and applied them to their respective banks. 23 In its analysis of the LTCM crisis, the BIS goes on to suggest that policy makers should learn the following 'tentative lessons from this experience:' Foremost is the realisation that the first line of defence at a time of market stress is sound risk management by market participants, which in turn requires a regulatory and monetary policy environment ensuring that market discipline effectively governs credit decisions and risk-taking. Policymakers should also appreciate that the fallout from last year's financial market strains was less pronounced on real activity in the industrial countries because a healthy commercial banking system was able to act as a substitute means of intermediating funds. 24 Several themes run though these statements. They are, first, the importance that the G-10 central bankers gave to risk taking and risk management by market participants; second, the view that the more robust and resilient a nation's banking and financial system, the more able it is to survive and function in a financial crisis; third, the confidence the central bankers showed in the regulatory framework in place within the advanced capitalist nations ahead of both crises, a framework they believed had allowed their banking and financial systems to withstand the Asian and LTCM turmoil without too much damage; and fourth, the importance that the G-10 central bankers gave to the 'Three Pillars' of the Capital Accord -regulatory capital requirements involving the use of internal risk-measurement and risk-control systems, market disclosure and discipline, and prudential supervision and regulation -in maintaining the resilience of their banking and financial systems. The implications of the statements are clear. The authorities took the measures they did in establishing the 'New International Financial Architecture' to strengthen the existing BIS capital requirement regime. They thus warned investors about the risks of lending to the periphery and took measures to 'involve' the private sector in the resolution of future financial crises there to encourage risk taking and risk management. And the authorities determined that the more serious lapses lay in the periphery and not in the centre because of their confidence in the crisis management capacities of the regime they had already put in place in the centre.
CAN THE CENTRE HOLD?
But is the confidence of the financial authorities justified? There is a widely-held belief, not confined to the left, that a crisis of the dollar is now unavoidable, threatening the dominance of the US financial system and the imperial power of the US state that stands at the centre of the global capitalist order. At the root of the problem, according to this view, is the US current account deficit. The deficit is unsustainable, the argument goes, because every quarter's current account deficit means an equivalent increase in the United States' net debtor position, which is already massive. Eventually, foreign investors will get tired of purchasing US assets, and this will lead to a run on the US dollar. If this view were correct, the argument of this essay would be problematic, to say the least. It would be hard to maintain, as we have, that neoliberal global capitalism is a world economic system wherein the financial and economic turmoil is distributed internationally depending on the strength and resilience of the national banking and financial systems that make up the imperial chain, and in which persistent financial and economic instability reproduces capitalist and imperialist social relations by punishing and disciplining subordinate classes and nations.
But, in fact, the view that the US current account deficit must issue in a dollar crisis is mistaken. The relationship between the US current account deficit and the net change in the US net debtor position used in the argument is an accounting identity and has no explanatory power. What matters to foreign investors is not the total size of their investments in the United States relative to the total size of US investments abroad, which is what the US net foreign asset position measures. What matters to them is the share of their US investments in their portfolios and the expected returns on the various components of their portfolios. Standard portfolio theory implies that foreign investors will reduce the relative US share in their investment portfolios if and only if the risk-adjusted expected rate of return on US investments declines relative to the risk-adjusted rates of returns on their investments elsewhere; and that they will reduce their investments in the United States if and only if they anticipate losses on their dollar exposures.
The US national banking and financial system is the strongest and most resilient one of all and thus sits at the top of the imperial chain. This is why foreign investors, like US investors, are willing to hold dollar assets. The market that truly matters here is not the US stock market, but the US Treasury market. The US Treasury market is the deepest and most liquid market in the world because US Treasuries have the lowest credit risks. It is the market in which the Federal Reserve operates, and Treasury bills, notes, and bonds have the 'full faith and credit of the government of United States'. For these reasons, the US Treasury market is the foundation of the interna-tional financial system. This both reflects and gives the United States tremendous power. For if the argument we have presented in this essay has any validity, it implies that the global economic and financial instability is shifted everywhere away from the United States. This is why no proper understanding of the international economic system can be had today without an understanding of the nature of imperialism today. Neoliberal globalization is a historically radical capitalist project, an attempt to discipline subordinate classes and nations through economic intimidation. But since the attempt to maintain and extend capitalist social relations through recurrent financial and economic crises is an inherently risky venture, neoliberal capitalism is also a dangerous, even a radically absurd, historical project: the global financial system is a chaotic system that if left to its own devices might well collapse. This is why the centralizing, organizing, and coercive activities of the capitalist state, and above all of the US imperial state at the centre of the system, continue to play such an essential role. If financial instability is a means by which capital disciplines world capitalism, capital had to find a way to regulate and control it, to make a liberalized global financial system not just resilient enough to survive its own disorder but also resilient in such a way as to maintain its fundamental hierarchical structure. The capitalist state, and especially the US imperial state, disciplines the financial discipliners. Accord, each of a bank's assets has a prescribed risk weight and the 8 per cent capital minimum requirements applies to the value of the asset as this value is adjusted by its risk weight. A bank's claims on OECD central governments, for example, have a zero risk weight and the capital requirements pose no cost to the banks in terms of capital they can't lend out and make money from. A
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